This is an elegant book, its 125 pages providing a deceptively concise introduction to Plotinus. I say "deceptively" concise because its brevity (the text itself is only 113 pages long) might mistakenly be thought to signal a cursory look at Plotinus's philosophy. It is in fact a sign of the care with which the book has been put together, its compactness the result of the author's ability both to focus on pertinent aspects of Plotinus's philosophy and present them succinctly.
Especially as the precis that begins the book advertises it as a work that should "make Plotinus more generally accessible" (p. i), Schroeder's book invites questions about Plotinus's relevance to contemporary philosophical concerns. One might ask not merely whether he provides a reasonable account of Plotinus (certainly he does) but, more interestingly, whether his account suggests that Plotinian philosophy is a valuable one meriting our attention. The further question whether his Plotinus is free of major philosophical defects therefore warrants special comment.
One notable aspect of Schroeder's approach to Plotinus is its pointedly unsystematic character. Denying that Plotinus develops a metaphysical system (p. 11), Schroeder proceeds by discussing five overlapping and interconnected aspects of the Plotinian point of view. For the most part, this approach is refreshing and works well, the overlapping themes converging and reconverging on the essential elements of Plotinus's philosophy. Chapters 2 and 3 ("Light" and "Silence") are particularly evocative accounts of two facets of Plotinus's philosophy that powerfully reflect its central themes.
Schroeder's commitment to an exposition that is avowedly unsystematic does not mean that his book has no focus. It is found in his suggestion that the contemplation of the Platonic Form is, for Plotinus, "an intrinsically valuable object of vision" (p. 4), its value not depending on a causal or explanatory role-"As such it belongs to [the realm of] enjoyment rather than to use" (p. 111). As Schroeder himself emphasizes, Plotinus thus stresses those aspects of Plato's philosophy that the contemporary scholar "will find somewhat embarrassing," that is, "the Platonic description of Form as an object of ecstatic experience, cast in the language of... passion and intoxication" (p. 4).
Just because this is a striking aspect of Plato to which we tend to turn a cold shoulder, this makes Plotinus more rather than less interesting. Historically, it drives home the point that "The disjunction that we would introduce between rational enquiry and ecstasy is not valid for an understanding of the Plotinian Plato" (p. 4), or for Greek philosophy more generally. We are likely to think that we ignore these aspects of Greek philosophy for good reason, because they constitute a strange conglomeration of mysticism and philosophy which is too untenable to be taken seriously. At least some of what Schroeder has to say suggests that such an attitude is prejudice rather than considered judgment.
It is especially useful to find Schroeder devoting much of Chapter 1 to a discussion of the famous arguments against the forms propounded in Plato'sParmenides. According to the "day and sail" argument, the Form cannot be distributed among particulars, for this would separate it from itself and undermine its identity (largeness would, for example, become smallness because it is broken into parts). Schroeder provides an answer to this critique of Form, pointing out that Plotinus takes day (rather than the sail) as a model for the Form and that day can be present at different places (at Athens and Sparta) without being divided and divisible. More deeply, Plotinus holds that the "day and sail" is founded on the artificial division of the One by the intellect, 1 a division he ultimately denies. As Schroeder says, his philosophy goes in the opposite direction, rejecting the notion that the Form and philosophy are "the handmaiden to science and technology," reasserting the primacy of the Form and the One. "When we divide the Form, we constitute ourselves and the world around so as to exclude that vision and that ecstasy [that contemplation of the Form provides]" (p. 10).
In the "copy-likeness" argument, Parmenides argues that the Form is posited to explain similarity among particulars, concluding that we must postulate a further form to explain the similarity between form and particular, between this new form and particular, and so on, ad infinitum. Plotinus answers by distinguishing two senses of the Greek word homoios ("likeness"), one meaning similarity, the other imitation. Particulars imitate the Form and the Form is similar to the particular, but the Form does not imitate anything, not allowing the infinite regress postulated by Parmenides. "To maintain the cognitive priority of pattern to copy is to avoid the infinite regress of the copy-likeness argument which reduces pattern and copy to the same explanatory level" (p. 12). We confuse the Form's likeness to the particular with imitation because we analyze it "as a multiplicity of attributes the unity of which may only properly be understood with reference to the model" (p. 13)-as we view a portrait by assuming that similar attributes are unified in the person it presents. Here again the ultimate cause of confusion is a division of a prior unity which Plotinus does not allow.
It is natural to protest that the dissolving of all distinctions that Schroeder uses to undermine these arguments against the Forms undermines Plotinus's philosophy as well, depending as the latter does on the distinctions tacitly assumed by language. In Chapter 4 ("Word"), Schroeder shows that such a protest is mistaken, elaborating a Plotinian account of language that is much more sophisticated than the one assumed by such objections. According to Plotinus, we can engage in discursive thought and speech about the One, but we cannot thereby disclose it. In view of this, Schroeder asks the natural question why we should continue to discuss the One as Plotinus and his disciples do, attempting to provide an answer. His attempt to rationalize such behaviour by saying that the One bestows speech upon us (pp. 69, 74) is unconvincing (the One bestows the entire material world on us, but this does not mean that we should indulge in it), but he does make a good case for the claim that Plotinus provides "a middle ground between discussing and disclosing the One," which allows for useful discussion of it. According to this account, "Philosophical language may, on the analogy of mantic inspiration, declare the One. We have thus three forms of discourse about the One: disclosure, discussion and declaration. While disclosure may be impossible, we may yet discuss or declare" (p. 70). One might compare Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing. Thus speech cannot capture the One but it can be used to push us, nudge us, point us, in its direction, "summoning us toward it" (p. 74). Dialectic and the Socratic spirit are, as Schroeder points out, thereby made an important element of the Plotinian way of philosophizing (his hermeneutical interpretation of this philosophizing is less persuasive, but it is interesting).
Schroeder's Chapter 5 ("Love") is not as convincing as his other chapters. It attempts to provide a theoretical basis for a Plotinian conception of human relationships and, in particular, love. The discussion is erudite and interesting, but does not overcome the fundamental problems posed by Plotinus's emphasis on the Self and the One, an emphasis that inevitably renders other individuals peripheral, except perhaps as fellow travellers along the way. There may be some mystical sense of love that this allows, but it remains very difficult to see how it approximates anything we would normally classify as love or human relationship. Unlike the other chapters, Chapter 5 seems to deflect attention away from the central themes in Plotinus's philosophy.
But Schroeder's account of love is not essential to an understanding of Plotinian philosophy and it might still be said that he presents this philosophy in a way that provides an erudite discussion of Plotinus. Schroeder's account does away with some of the fundamental objections typically made against Plotinus. Whether this is enough to rehabilitate Plotinus in the context of contemporary philosophy is a difficult question, for though his Plotinus is relatively consistent and coherent, consistency and coherence are not enough to establish convincingly a philosophical position. In the case of Plotinus, the necessary further ingredient seems to be a personal experience or inclination that makes one open to a mystical enjoyment of the One, or at least its possibility. This is not something that can be expected from Schroeder. Given some such receptivity, it can, however, be said that his book can help provide the rest. Note 1 Thus "That which is formed into the universe has its form divided, man in one place and the sun in another; but the forming nature has all things in one" (p. 10). In this volume, Georges Leroux presents the Henry and Schwyzer edit io minor text of Plotinus, Enneads 6.8 (39)' with his own translation on facing pages together with an Introduction and Commentary. In addition to his philological contributions, Leroux, who has a wider and more general interest in the philosophy of will beyond Plotinus, presents in the Introduction (amply nourished by his Commentary) an interpretation of the place of the will in this author. Because the philosophy of Plotinus does not easily lend itself to linear synthesis, this genre of commentary is becoming increasingly popular. In 6.8 (39) the primary locus and paradigm of the will is not in ethics but in metaphysics. Plotinus shifts the ground from Aristotelian ethics to a synthesis of Platon-
